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ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
Saul P. Morgenstern, Jennifer B. Patterson & Terri A. Mazur* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately defines the standards by 
which marketplace conduct is to be judged under the antitrust laws, and 
other circuit and district courts make significant contributions to the law’s 
development, there is no question that the Second Circuit and the district 
courts within it often have led the way in developing the nation’s antitrust 
jurisprudence.  Routinely cited, the Second Circuit’s decisions have often 
broken new analytical ground and either set the standard by which other 
courts judge similar questions or set the table for resolution by the Supreme 
Court. 
A running thread through Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence is a 
willingness to examine market participants’ real-world conduct and the 
consequences of that conduct in seeking out the balance between 
incentivizing robust competition and protecting the market—and ultimately 
consumers—from distortions caused by anticompetitive conduct.  Thus, the 
Second Circuit has arguably led the way in defining how we determine 
whether a monopoly violates the law and what constraints apply to the 
conduct of one who holds a lawfully acquired monopoly. 
Similarly, the circuit has laid the groundwork for national adoption of a 
damages analysis for violations of the Robinson-Patman Act that 
recognized the difference between the harm Congress sought to remedy by 
that law and the harm caused by conspiracy and monopolization under 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  In other areas, the court has provided 
important input into the national conversation about areas of antitrust law in 
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the wake of Supreme Court decisions that changed the direction of the law, 
helping to fill in the blanks left by those decisions. 
This Article collects and describes rulings that, in the authors’ view, 
reflect these themes in Second Circuit antitrust jurisprudence.  The court’s 
long history in this substantive space, its likely continued exposure to 
critical antitrust questions, and the importance of this area of the law to our 
national economy assure that others will be examining and shedding further 
light on the Second Circuit’s important work in antitrust well into the 
future. 
I.  MONOPOLIZATION 
The extent of the Second Circuit’s influence is no more apparent than in 
cases of alleged monopolization.  The words of the Sherman Act paint 
broad strokes, leaving to the courts the task of applying its guidance to the 
real world of commerce and markets.  Section 2 of the Sherman Act is no 
exception, stating that it is unlawful to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize” trade or commerce.1  While the statute could be read to outlaw 
any monopoly, it did not take long for courts to realize that such a broad 
prohibition might cause more harm than good.  Such prohibition could 
deprive businesses from attracting customers by rewarding their loyalty 
with good value, thereby removing an important incentive essential to 
robust competition.  This inherent ambiguity left it to the courts to navigate 
the tension between preventing the unlawful acquisition of monopoly power 
and allowing monopolies formed through honest competition to exist and 
even to thrive.  The Second Circuit jumped into that issue in United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America2 (Alcoa) and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co.,3 two opinions that have shaped this country’s approach to 
monopolization in antitrust enforcement nationwide and laid the 
groundwork for later decisions on the boundaries imposed on what the 
owners of lawfully acquired monopolies may do. 
A.  Establishing a Framework 
for Considering Monopolization Cases:  Alcoa 
Judge Learned Hand’s 1945 opinion for the court in Alcoa serves as the 
basis for analysis of alleged section 2 violations of the Sherman Act.  In that 
case, the Second Circuit had to decide whether Aluminum Company of 
America (“Alcoa”) had monopolized the virgin aluminum ingot market—of 
which it controlled more than 90 percent—in violation of section 2.4  The 
case came before the Second Circuit after the trial court ruled that Alcoa 
had not monopolized the market.5  Judge Hand examined the distinction 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 2. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 3. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 4. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 423. 
 5. Id. at 436. 
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between acquiring a monopoly by competing successfully and acquiring a 
monopoly unlawfully.6 
First, the court had to determine whether Alcoa was a monopoly by 
considering the company’s size and control within the marketplace.7  The 
Alcoa opinion articulated a framework by which courts should consider 
whether a monopoly exists—a rubric that remains the standard today.  
Under this framework, courts must determine the relevant market in which 
the alleged monopolist operates and then assess the alleged monopolist’s 
power within that defined market.  Accordingly, different definitions of the 
relevant market could yield different conclusions regarding the existence of 
a monopoly.8  In Alcoa, if the market included only virgin aluminum ingot 
sold in the United States, purchasers would have little choice but to buy 
from Alcoa because the company had more than a 90 percent market share.9  
If secondary aluminum ingot—aluminum salvaged from initial usage and 
repurposed—could be substituted for virgin aluminum, and therefore 
included in the relevant market, Alcoa’s share would have fallen to 64 
percent.10  Finally, if the part of Alcoa’s ingot production that it fabricated 
into products—and therefore did not sell as ingot—were excluded from the 
market, then Alcoa’s share would have fallen to about 33 percent.11 
Judge Hand defined the relevant market as the total amount of virgin 
aluminum ingot available for sale in the United States, excluding secondary 
aluminum ingot and including Alcoa’s captive sales, which resulted in a 
market share in the relevant market of more than 90 percent.12  The Alcoa 
decision set the standard for monopolization cases; courts must define the 
relevant market in order to determine the market power of a potential 
monopolist.13  Judge Hand reasoned that controlling 90 percent of the 
market allowed Alcoa to control prices within the market14 and thus found 
that Alcoa had sufficient market power to be a monopolist. 
The opinion also set some broad guideposts as to what would, and would 
not, be sufficient market share to create risk of a monopoly, stating that “it 
is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough [market 
share to constitute a monopoly]; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not.”15  
Judge Hand did not articulate the reasoning behind these guideposts, nor 
did he identify a threshold market share amount that would indicate a 
monopoly.  Nevertheless, the Alcoa decision created an unprecedented 
framework for assessing whether a monopoly exists—a framework that 
remains the starting point in assessing monopolization claims.  To this day, 
U.S. antitrust jurisprudence includes no fixed definition of how much 
 
 6. Id. at 429. 
 7. See id. at 429–30. 
 8. Id. at 424–25.  
 9. Id. at 425. 
 10. See id. at 424. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 425. 
 13. See id. at 422–32. 
 14. Id. at 425. 
 15. Id. at 424. 
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market share indicates monopoly.  Monopoly power is defined by Alcoa’s 
rule:  whether a company has the power to control prices and exclude 
competition. 
The Alcoa decision is also notable for its discussion of the circumstances 
under which a monopolist is guilty of monopolization under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, cementing the distinction between merely being a monopolist 
and having “monopolized” unlawfully in violation of section 2.  Judge 
Hand noted that Alcoa “may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may 
have been thrust upon it.”16  In particular, Judge Hand’s opinion argued 
against a reading of section 2 of the Sherman Act that would create a 
blanket prohibition of monopolies, identifying three scenarios in which a 
monopoly was “thrust upon” a company, rather than obtained through 
unlawful monopolizing activity by the company:  First, a “natural 
monopoly,” when the nature of the industry only supports one seller.  
Second, when changes to taste or cost drive a seller’s competition out of the 
market.  Third, when a seller becomes a monopoly by virtue of being the 
most successful competitor in a given market.17  In discussing this third 
scenario, Judge Hand noted that 
a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose the 
public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not mean to condemn the 
resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster:  finis 
opus coronat.  The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, 
must not be turned upon when he wins.18 
In considering whether a monopoly had been “thrust upon” Alcoa, Judge 
Hand reasoned that a company is not guilty of monopolization when it is 
but a “passive beneficiary of a monopoly.”19  Judge Hand determined that 
Alcoa had not been a passive beneficiary because it had actively pursued its 
monopoly status by “progressively [embracing] each new opportunity as it 
opened” and thereby “fac[ing] every newcomer with new capacity already 
geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade 
connections and the elite of personnel.”20  Thus, Judge Hand found Alcoa 
to have engaged in monopolization and thereby to have violated section 2 
of the Sherman Act.21 
Judge Hand’s application of the principles he articulated to Alcoa 
arguably crossed the line he had drawn and created a per se rule prohibiting 
dominant firms within a market from using the benefit of their size and skill 
to compete in that market, even if their dominance has been won by fair and 
effective competition.  As some critics have noted, “after Alcoa, the 
successful competitor may indeed be ‘turned upon’ because he may not 
 
 16. Id. at 429 (emphases added). 
 17. See id. at 429–30. 
 18. Id. at 430. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 431. 
 21. See id. 
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compete.”22  For that reason, the application of the principle to the specific 
facts in Alcoa has been revisited over time.  However, Judge Hand’s 
principle lives on—courts recognize that one can lawfully acquire 
monopoly power and that monopoly power is not an unfair reward for 
successful competition.  As a result, Judge Hand’s distinction between 
merely being a monopolist and unlawfully monopolizing under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act has been broadly cited by monopolization decisions issued 
throughout the country over many decades. 
B.  The Next Phase in Determining a Test 
for Unlawful Monopolization:  Berkey 
Alcoa generally went unchallenged across circuits until 1979, when the 
Second Circuit issued its historic antitrust opinion in Berkey, written by 
then-Chief Judge Kaufman.23  Kodak was a fully integrated manufacturer of 
cameras, light-sensitive film, photographic paper on which the film could 
be printed, and the various processing chemicals used to develop film and 
paper.24  Kodak was a leader in the industry and regularly introduced new 
products, including new types of amateur cameras and films, often in new 
sizes.25  Berkey was a much smaller competitor in those markets and 
complained that Kodak’s introduction of new products without warning 
allowed Kodak to thwart competition by preventing others from offering 
competing products on a timely basis. 
It was uncontested in Berkey that Kodak had a monopoly in the sale of 
cameras, film, and color paper.26  However, Berkey presented an 
opportunity for the court to revisit the issue of when a monopoly is lawfully 
acquired and thus address whether and how section 2 of the Sherman Act 
limited a dominant company’s ability to compete.  The Berkey Court began 
by abandoning Alcoa’s arguably narrow view of when a monopoly is 
lawfully acquired, stating that “[a]s an operative rule of law . . . the ‘thrust 
upon’ phrase does not suffice.”27  Instead, based on a comprehensive 
analysis of previous case law discussing the facets of section 2 of the 
 
 22. Edward D. Cavanagh, Antitrust in the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 795, 
799 (1991). 
 23. Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 24. Before the invention of digital cameras, which capture photographs on a built-in 
sensor, photographers relied on plastic film coated with chemicals that, when exposed to 
light, recorded images that became visible (in negative image) when treated with other 
chemicals.  Those images could be projected onto similarly coated paper, which could then 
be treated to develop the image as it appeared in the real world (i.e., the opposite of the 
negative image on the film).  Thus, to take photographs, a photographer needed a camera and 
film, and someone (either the photographer or a photofinishing lab) had to develop the film 
and print paper photographs to finish the process.  Kodak made and sold all of the necessary 
products and offered photofinishing services to amateurs who could not, or did not want to, 
do it themselves after taking pictures. 
 25. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 269. 
 26. Id. at 269–71. 
 27. Id. at 274. 
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Sherman Act, the court recognized that even a monopolist should be 
permitted to compete and not be limited to succeeding by accident.28 
As a preliminary matter, the Berkey Court adopted the Supreme Court’s 
rule in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.29 that the first step 
in analyzing a section 2 claim is to define the relevant market.30  Consistent 
with Judge Hand’s approach in Alcoa, the du Pont Court’s analysis of 
whether a monopoly existed began with the Court’s determination of the 
appropriate market.  The Berkey Court similarly adopted the Supreme 
Court’s 1966 pronouncement in United States v. Grinnell Corp.31 that “after 
monopoly . . . power is found, the second element of the [section] 2 offense 
is ‘the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acumen, or historic accident.’”32  Grinnell’s articulation of the 
section 2 offense was, of course, a slightly different way of stating the 
principle Judge Hand articulated in Alcoa—a monopoly won by competing 
effectively is not unlawful.33  Expanding on the jurisprudence of Alcoa and 
Grinnell, the Berkey Court then went a step further, holding that “the law’s 
hostility to monopoly power extends beyond the means of its acquisition.  
Even if that power has been legitimately acquired, the monopolist may not 
wield it to prevent or impede competition.”34  The Second Circuit in Berkey 
thus articulated a gloss on the Alcoa-Grinnell principle.  While a lawful 
monopolist was free to reap the benefits of success, it could not use its 
monopoly power to entrench itself: 
The mere possession of monopoly power does not ipso facto condemn a 
market participant.  But, to avoid the proscriptions of [section] 2, the firm 
must refrain at all times from conduct directed at smothering competition.  
This doctrine has two branches.  Unlawfully acquired power remains 
anathema even when kept dormant.  And it is no less true that a firm with 
legitimately achieved monopoly may not wield the resulting power to 
tighten its hold on the market.35 
Having stated that broad principle, the Berkey Court examined whether 
Kodak’s monopoly position obliged it to disclose its new product 
developments in the camera and film industries to competitors like Berkey 
in advance, enabling them to introduce compatible products when Kodak 
did, rather than forcing competitors to play catch up.36  The court 
determined that Kodak was not obligated to do so.37  The Berkey Court 
noted that withholding advance knowledge of one’s new products and 
 
 28. Id. at 274–75. 
 29. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).  In du Pont, the dissenting opinion identifies Judge Hand’s 
Alcoa decision as a “landmark section 2 case.” Id. at 424 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 30. See Berkey, 603 F.2d at 268–69 (citing du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391–93). 
 31. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
 32. Berkey, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570–71). 
 33. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 275. 
 36. See id. at 279–85. 
 37. Id. at 284. 
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advancements is typically valid competitive conduct.38  The court observed 
that “a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by [section] 2 to 
compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve through 
‘the process of invention and innovation’ is clearly tolerated by the antitrust 
laws.”39  Thus, the Berkey Court declined to require monopolists to help 
smaller firms, making it clear that lawfully acquired monopolies are entitled 
to the benefits of their dominant market share. 
The Berkey Court did, however, recognize limits to using lawfully 
acquired power in one market to acquire dominance in other markets.  
Stating that “[i]t is clear that a firm may not employ its market position as a 
lever to create—or attempt to create—a monopoly in another market,” the 
Berkey Court examined whether Kodak had leveraged its monopoly power 
in the film and camera markets to gain illicit advantages in the 
photofinishing equipment market, where Kodak was not a monopolist.40  
The Berkey Court determined that Kodak did not gain competitive 
advantage in the photofinishing market when it introduced Kodacolor II 
film, which required a new photofinishing process, along with its 110 
camera.41  Further, the Berkey Court clarified that, because Kodak was an 
integrated firm, the advantages the company gained from selling equipment 
required for the new photofinishing process used in its new film and camera 
did not constitute monopolization.42 
The Berkey decision clarified many important principles within the law 
of monopolization.  It established that a monopolist may compete 
vigorously on the merits with smaller rivals and may capitalize on 
economies of scale resulting from its larger size.43  This was a shift from 
earlier thinking, as seen in Alcoa, that a monopoly had to exercise special 
restraint.44  Instead, the Berkey decision employed competition laws to 
promote economic efficiency rather than to shield inefficient competitors.  
However, while a monopolist may exploit efficiencies arising from its 
integration in multiple markets, the Second Circuit made clear that there 
was a limit:  a monopolist may not use its monopoly power to block 
competition or to grow its power in other markets in which it does not have 
monopoly power.  Because it found for Kodak on the facts, the Berkey 
Court did not have the opportunity to articulate where that limit lies.45  That 
task was left to later cases, many of which—including those in other 
circuits—to this day still start their analysis where Berkey left off.46 
 
 38. Id. at 281. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 275 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); SmithKline Corp. v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 41. Id. at 281. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 45. Cavanagh, supra note 22, at 807. 
 46. See, e.g., Catlin v. Wash. Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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C.  Regulating the Behavior of a Monopolist:  
What Constitutes Illicit Monopolization? 
Since Alcoa and Berkey, the Second Circuit has, on several occasions, 
had the opportunity to define the lawful limits on what lawful monopolists 
may do to “protect their turf.” 
1.  Predatory Pricing 
In 1981, in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.47 (AT&T), Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit applied the 
rationale of Berkey to consider the difference between “engag[ing] in 
vigorous competition” and “subvert[ing] the competitive process by unfair 
or unreasonable means.”48  In AT&T, the plaintiff, Northeastern Telephone 
Company, a relatively small supplier of telephone equipment, alleged that 
the defendants AT&T and its affiliates serving the Connecticut area were 
selling their public branch exchanges (PBX) and key telephones below cost, 
and that the two-tier pricing schemes that the defendants were offering to 
certain business customers were anticompetitive.49  The Second Circuit 
considered whether such activities constituted “predatory pricing,” which it 
defined as “the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of 
driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses through 
higher profits earned in the absence of competition.”50  The court 
acknowledged that “[p]redatory pricing is difficult to distinguish from 
vigorous price competition” and is likely rare.51  The court also expressed 
concern that “[i]nadvertently condemning [price] competition as an instance 
of predation [would] undoubtedly chill the very behavior the antitrust laws 
seek to promote.”52  Thus, in AT&T, the court found that, while predatory 
pricing was certainly anticompetitive, “the rarity of the phenomenon” must 
inform a court’s definition of such activity.53 
Balancing these considerations, the Second Circuit shied away from 
creating a complex analysis for determining predatory pricing.54  Instead, 
the court endorsed a bright-line rule directing courts to compare a firm’s 
marginal costs to the prices it charges to determine whether those prices are 
predatory.55  If average or typical marginal costs exceed prices, those prices 
are presumptively predatory.56  If not, they are presumptively 
competitive.57 
 
 47. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 48. Id. at 79. 
 49. See id. at 81. 
 50. Id. at 86 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and 
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 698 (1975)). 
 51. Id. at 88. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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Applying this newly articulated test for determining whether the 
defendants had engaged in predatory pricing, the court in AT&T found no 
showing that the defendants’ conduct was beyond the bounds of 
competitive propriety as laid out in Berkey, noting that the record contained 
no evidence that the defendants had priced below marginal cost.58  The 
court noted, however, that pricing schemes similar to those of the AT&T 
defendants might be predatory if a plaintiff could show that a defendant 
omitted direct costs, the inclusion of which would cause marginal cost to 
exceed price.59  The court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that average or 
fully distributed costs should be considered.60  Throughout its AT&T 
decision, the Second Circuit tied the determination of predatory pricing to 
marginal cost, a crucial step in the development of the law in this area.61 
2.  “Product Hopping” 
A patent is effectively a limited-duration lawful monopoly over the 
market for the patented invention.  When a patent is close to expiring, some 
companies seek to preserve their market position by inducing customers to 
transition to a new product, or new version of the product that is protected 
by a longer-term patent.  Recently, in New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. 
Actavis PLC,62 the Second Circuit became the first circuit to explore when 
“product improvement” crosses the line into “product hopping” in violation 
of section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.63   For years, Actavis had marketed 
Namenda IR, a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease taken twice a day.64  As 
the patent term for Namenda IR was coming to an end, Actavis introduced 
Namenda XR, a formulation that could be taken once daily—an 
improvement in the eyes of some.65  Namenda XR enjoys patent protection 
through 2029.66 
Typically, when a pharmaceutical patent term expires, generic 
manufacturers enter the market, and pharmacists are either permitted or 
required to fill prescriptions with lower-cost generic versions of the 
originally patented drug.67  Thus, patients taking Namenda IR after July 
2015 would, in many instances, receive a less-expensive generic version if 
one were introduced.  However, for regulatory reasons, pharmacies would 
 
 58. Id. at 90–91. 
 59. Id. at 91. 
 60. Id. at 89–90. 
 61. The Second Circuit’s AT&T decision has been discussed with approval by other 
circuits addressing similar questions regarding predatory pricing. See, e.g., United States. v. 
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 62. 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 63. Id. at 643 n.2.  An appeal on product hopping claims has recently been filed in the 
Third Circuit. See Mylan Pharm. Inc., v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 
1736957 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 15-2236 (3d Cir. May 20, 2015). 
 64. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 647. 
 67. Id. at 645 & n.7. 
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not be permitted to substitute a generic version of Namenda IR for a 
Namenda XR prescription.68 
As the patent term on Namenda IR was close to expiring, Actavis used 
both “soft-switch” and “hard-switch” strategies to transition Namenda IR 
patients to Namenda XR.69  Its soft-switch strategies included marketing 
Namenda XR aggressively to doctors and patients and selling it at a 
discount.70  Its hard-switch strategy was to take Namenda IR off the market 
near the end of its patent term, before generics could enter the market, 
forcing patients who wanted continuity of treatment to switch to Namenda 
XR, and to provide Namenda IR only through a mail order pharmacy—but 
only where continued treatment was “medically necessary.”71  New York 
State sought a preliminary injunction against the hard-switch strategy, 
which the trial court granted.72 
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge John Walker, affirmed the 
preliminary injunction, analyzing Actavis’s conduct under Berkey, which 
held that a monopolist’s introduction of a new product is not 
anticompetitive unless it compels consumers to purchase the new product.73  
In the Second Circuit’s view, Actavis’s hard-switch strategy crossed this 
line.74  Although the court did not explicitly rule on this issue, its reasoning 
implicitly endorsed the soft-switch strategy.75  Because evidence that 
Actavis sought to force the market to switch to the new product before 
generic substitution could occur made it substantially likely that New York 
State would succeed on the merits of its monopolization and attempted 
monopolization claims, the Second Circuit found that it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to grant the preliminary injunction.76  The 
Second Circuit’s ruling was consistent with several previous decisions by 
district courts in other cases involving alleged “product hopping.”77 
 
 68. See id. at 647. 
 69. Id. at 647–48. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 648. 
 72. Id. at 649. 
 73. Id. at 653 (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 n.39 
(2d Cir. 1979)). 
 74. Id. at 654. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. at 651. 
 77. See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 WL 
1736957 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (granting summary judgment to the defendant even though 
it withdrew an old product from the market, because the relevant market contained a variety 
of similar products); In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 685 (E.D. Pa. 
2014) (holding that allegations that a pharmaceutical company threatened to remove a 
product from the market and did remove it a few weeks after entry of generic into market 
stated a viable Sherman Act claim); Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 
2d 146, 150–52 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing Sherman Act claims because the plaintiffs had 
not alleged that any consumer choices were eliminated). 
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II.  HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS 
The Second Circuit has taken a leading role among the circuits in 
consistently condemning price fixing among competitors as restraints on 
trade that are per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.78  At the 
same time, the Second Circuit has attempted to avoid labels in favor of 
analyzing the substance of transactions to determine whether they are 
subject to the per se rule, following the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.79 (BMI), which arose in the Southern 
District of New York and is one of the most influential decisions relating to 
price restraints.  As the Supreme Court noted in BMI, “certain agreements 
or practices are so ‘plainly anticompetitive,’ and so often ‘lack . . . any 
redeeming virtue,’ that they are conclusively presumed illegal without 
further examination under the rule of reason generally applied in Sherman 
Act cases.”80 
Nevertheless, what constitutes a per se illegal practice has not always 
been clear, even when those practices involve “price fixing” in the literal 
sense.  The Supreme Court observed in BMI that “easy labels do not always 
supply ready answers”81 and warned that a literal approach “does not alone 
establish that [a] particular practice . . . is ‘plainly anticompetitive’ and very 
likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’”82  As business relationships have 
become increasingly complex, the Second Circuit has grappled with 
whether the per se rule or rule of reason analysis should apply to various 
pricing situations, looking to the Supreme Court’s BMI decision for 
guidance and analyzing the substance of a transaction to determine whether 
it is per se illegal.  The Second Circuit has adopted a markedly cautious 
approach to expanding the categories to which the per se rule applies, 
arguably leading the way in shaping the per se doctrine since BMI. 
This restraint is evident in the Second Circuit’s decisions in Volvo North 
American Corp. v. Men’s International Professional Tennis Council83 and 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,84 as well as the Second Circuit’s 
more recent decisions, such as Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. 
Salvino, Inc.85  These cases illustrate a shift toward a focus on the 
underlying economic rationality of the business arrangement at issue and 
away from mechanical characterizations.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
favorable reference to Salvino in its 2010 opinion in American Needle, Inc. 
 
 78. See, e.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 71 
(2d Cir. 1988). 
 79. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 80. Id. at 8 (first quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
692 (1978); then quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).  Under the 
rule of reason analysis, when a particular practice can be justified by legitimate business 
considerations, courts weigh the benefits of the practice against the negative effects on 
competition. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 9. 
 83. 857 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 84. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 85. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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v. National Football League86 is a testament to the Second Circuit’s 
influence on this issue.  On the other hand, the Second Circuit recently 
applied the per se rule in its decision in United States v. Apple, Inc.,87 
applying the rule to U.S. ebook publishers, noting that the BMI line of 
decisions was “narrow” and “limited” in scope.88  Whether, and to what 
extent, Apple represents a departure from the restraint evident in the Second 
Circuit’s post-BMI jurisprudence remains to be seen. 
A.  BMI 
The evolution of the Second Circuit’s cautionary approach to the per se 
rule as applied to horizontal restraints is best viewed in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in BMI.  The BMI case originated in 1975 in the Southern 
District of New York, when Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) 
brought suit against two music agencies, the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI), challenging their royalty practices.89  CBS alleged that the system 
by which these agencies (which act as clearing houses for music copyright 
owners and users) received fees for their issuance of “blanket licenses” to 
perform copyrighted musical compositions constituted illegal price fixing.90  
BMI and ASCAP had nonexclusive rights to grant blanket licenses of an 
artist’s work to people or companies that sought to obtain the rights to use a 
particular work.91  Artists and composers joined with ASCAP and BMI to 
set a price for the blanket license.92  Thus, for an annual fee, a licensee like 
CBS could gain the rights to use any song in a writer’s repertoire but could 
not license individual works through BMI or ASCAP.  It could, however, 
negotiate licenses for individual works directly through the copyright 
holders, because BMI and ASCAP were nonexclusive licensors.  
Nevertheless, CBS argued that the blanket license violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, among other provisions.93 
The district court dismissed CBS’s case following a trial only on liability 
issues, finding that the blanket license did not constitute a per se violation 
of section 1.94  The court also found that the blanket license was not an 
unreasonable restraint on trade because CBS was free to negotiate with 
individual copyright holders.95  The Second Circuit reversed and remanded 
the decision, holding, in a very literal analysis of the defendant’s conduct, 
that the blanket licensing arrangement was unlawful price fixing because 
the composers and publishing houses had “joined together into an 
 
 86. 560 U.S. 183 (2010). 
 87. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016). 
 88. Id. at 325–26 (citing Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 203). 
 89. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1979). 
 90. See id. at 5. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. at 5–6. 
 94. See id. at 6. 
 95. See id. 
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organization that sets its price for the blanket license it sells,” which 
constituted a per se violation of section 1.96 
The Supreme Court reversed, refusing to apply the per se rule to the 
blanket license at issue in BMI.97  The Court acknowledged the value of the 
per se rule, but criticized the Second Circuit’s “literal approach” in applying 
it, explaining that “when two partners set the price of their goods or 
services they are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation 
of the Sherman Act.”98  The Court concluded that before a particular 
practice can be condemned under the per se rule, it must be found to be 
“plainly anticompetitive.”99  Because the alleged restraint, blanket 
licensing, was not within the group of business practices to which the per se 
rule had been applied previously, there was no “nearly universal” view on 
whether these practices should be subject to “automatic condemnation” 
rather than “a careful assessment under the rule of reason.”100  Noting that 
the commerce involved—obtaining the performing rights to copyrighted 
music—exists only because of copyright law, and that the marketing 
arrangement was reasonably necessary to monitor the use of thousands of 
copyrighted materials, the Supreme Court concluded there was no 
anticompetitive purpose behind the use of the blanket licenses at issue.101 
B.  Buffalo Broadcasting, Volvo and du Pont 
After the BMI decision, the Second Circuit took a cautious approach to 
the application of the per se rule.  First, in an action by local broadcasting 
affiliates against BMI and ASCAP, raising virtually the same issues as the 
original BMI case, Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Society of 
Composers, Authors & Publishers,102 the Second Circuit followed the 
Supreme Court’s holding and concluded that blanket licensing to affiliate 
stations did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on trade subject to the 
per se rule.103 
The Second Circuit also took a restrained approach in applying the per se 
rule to alleged horizontal price fixing and horizontal division of markets in 
several aspects of men’s professional tennis events in its decision in 
Volvo.104  There, three sponsors of men’s professional tennis events brought 
suit against a tennis governing body, the Men’s International Professional 
Tennis Council (MIPTC), its chairman, and its administrator, claiming that 
MIPTC had improperly conspired with a rival organization, World 
Championship Tennis, Inc., to restrain trade in men’s tennis in violation of 
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 98. Id. at 9. 
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 100. Id. at 16. 
 101. Id. at 20–21. 
 102. 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 103. Id. at 933. 
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section 1.105  In particular, the sponsors and producers of tennis 
tournaments alleged that the governing organizations had established 
agreements with sponsors, producers, and players that dictated tournament 
scheduling priority, limited player compensation, and discouraged players, 
sponsors, and producers from participating in independent tennis events.106  
Volvo argued that these agreements limited the number of successful and 
profitable events that could be sponsored outside of the governing bodies’ 
control.107 
On appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint, 
the Second Circuit examined the allegations of horizontal restraints—price 
fixing, horizontal market division, and group boycott—and considered 
whether the allegations were sufficient to fall under per se illegal conduct.  
The Second Circuit noted that, normally, price fixing agreements among 
competitors are considered per se illegal under section 1, but, adding some 
subtlety to a seemingly simple analysis, the court emphasized that the 
“relevant inquiry . . . involves more than ‘a question simply of determining 
whether two or more potential competitors have literally “fixed” a 
“price,”’” because determining when a practice should be characterized as 
price fixing could be very difficult.108 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit “express[ed] no opinion” as to whether 
the conduct was per se unlawful or subject to the rule of reason.109  Instead, 
the court directed on remand of the section 1 claim that the district court 
“carefully consider whatever arguments [the alleged price fixer] may offer 
in support of [its] practices relating to player compensation before deciding 
whether the per se rule or the [r]ule of [r]eason should apply.”110  With 
respect to the horizontal market division and group boycott claims, the 
court noted that it viewed the claims as adequately alleged, but again 
remanded the question of whether the per se rule or the rule of reason 
should apply to the district court.111 
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s decision in du Pont illustrates the court’s 
resistance to expanding the per se rule to section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (“the FTC Act”).112  The Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) had prohibited du Pont, Ethyl Corporation, and other compound 
manufacturers from announcing price changes before the thirty days 
provided by their contracts and from using “most favored nation” clauses 
regarding the price of their additives.113  The FTC challenged these 
practices even though the FTC conceded that the practices were not the 
result of any collusive agreement.114  Rather, these practices occurred in an 
 
 105. See id. at 57–63. 
 106. See id. at 58. 
 107. See id. at 60–61. 
 108. Id. at 71 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 72. 
 111. See id. at 72–73. 
 112. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 113. Id. at 130–32. 
 114. See id. at 135. 
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oligopolistic market characterized by high concentration, a small likelihood 
of new entrants because of a sharply declining market, inelastic demand, 
and homogeneity of product.115 
The Second Circuit vacated the FTC’s order, finding that the “mere 
existence of an oligopolistic market structure in which a small group of 
manufacturers engage in consciously parallel pricing of an identical product 
does not violate the antitrust laws.”116  The court rejected price signaling as 
a basis for liability under the FTC Act, noting that the FTC’s position could 
be construed to condemn any price increase by any seller in an oligopolistic 
market.117  Before labeling business conduct in an oligopolistic industry 
(absent tacit agreement) as “unfair” within the meaning of section 5, the 
court held that the FTC must allege that, at a minimum, “some indicia of 
oppressiveness” exist.118  The Second Circuit’s decision in du Pont has 
been influential across the country:  the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits have cited this holding from du Pont with approval in also rejecting 
a categorical approach to analyzing antitrust activity involving 
oligopolies.119 
C.  Salvino, American Needle, and Apple 
The Second Circuit has continued, for the most part, to take a restrained 
approach in applying the per se rule in more recent decisions addressing 
horizontal restraints.  Following BMI, other circuits adopted similarly 
cautious approaches to treating business arrangements among would-be 
competitors—especially business practices with which the court was 
unfamiliar—as per se restraints on trade.120  Commentators have noted, 
however, that some federal appellate courts have gone further than the 
Second Circuit in eroding traditional prohibitions against horizontal 
restraints such as the per se rule.121 
The Second Circuit’s restrained approach is evident in its 2008 decision 
in Major League Baseball Properties v. Salvino, Inc.122  In Salvino, the 
court held that the rule of reason—not the per se rule or quick-look 
doctrine—was the appropriate analytical tool to use in determining whether 
an exclusive license of every Major League Baseball (MLB) teams’ 
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intellectual property to Major League Baseball Properties (MLBP) illegally 
restrained trade.123 
In Salvino, a company that made and sold plush bean-filled bears 
featuring the logo of certain MLB clubs counterclaimed against MLBP, the 
exclusive licensing agent for MLB intellectual property, claiming that the 
centralization of the licensing in a single agent and the sharing of profits 
equally among all the MLB clubs were per se illegal under section 1.124  
The district court granted MLBP’s motion for summary judgment 
dismissing Salvino’s section 1 counterclaims, holding that the rule of reason 
should be used to analyze MLBP’s licensing of MLB’s intellectual property 
and that Salvino had failed to show that MLBP and its activities had an 
actual adverse effect on competition or that MLBP had sufficient market 
power to inhibit competition market-wide.125  On appeal, Salvino pressed 
its contentions that the MLB’s centralization of intellectual property 
licensing for baseball teams and purported output restrictions were “naked 
horizontal” restraints that were per se illegal.126  The Second Circuit 
rejected these claims, recognizing that the centralization of MLB 
intellectual property licensing was similar to the blanket licensing held not 
to be per se unlawful in BMI.127  The court affirmed the award of summary 
judgment to MLBP, concluding that simply making MLBP the exclusive 
licensor did not restrict or reduce the number of licenses to be used—“it 
merely alter[ed] the identity of the licenses’ issuer.”128  The Second Circuit 
also emphasized the high threshold for applying the per se rule:  “To justify 
a per se prohibition a restraint must have manifestly anticompetitive 
effects, . . . and lack . . . any redeeming virtue.”129  Concurring in the 
judgment, then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor noted that the per se and quick-
look approaches were “reserved for practices that facially appear to be ones 
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and 
decrease output.”130  This aspect of then-Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in 
Salvino has been cited by the Ninth and Federal Circuits in requiring 
scrutiny of joint ventures and profit-sharing arrangements under the rule of 
reason.131 
The Second Circuit’s opinion, including the concurrence, in Salvino has 
shaped subsequent law in this area, leading other courts to judge similar 
conduct under the rule of reason.  In its 2010 decision in American Needle, 
Inc. v. National Football League,132 the Supreme Court reviewed similar 
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licensing practices by the thirty-two National Football League (NFL) teams, 
which had formed a separate corporation, National Football League 
Properties (NFLP), to manage their intellectual property.  In finding that the 
NFLP was not a single economic enterprise capable of taking “independent 
action” but, rather, that its licensing activities constituted concerted action 
that must be judged under the rule of reason,133 the Supreme Court 
favorably cited then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor’s concurrence in Salvino, 
where the Judge departed from her colleagues and found the existence of a 
price agreement, warning that “competitors ‘cannot simply get around’ 
antitrust liability by acting ‘through a third-party intermediary or ‘joint 
venture.’”134  The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
whether the restraint was “essential” or otherwise justified under the rule of 
reason.135 
In a recent antitrust action, United States v. Apple, Inc.,136 the Second 
Circuit once again addressed the per se rule.  The majority, applying the per 
se rule with renewed vigor, affirmed the Southern District’s application of 
the rule to government allegations that Apple, a customer of five of the 
nation’s major ebook publishers, orchestrated a horizontal agreement 
among the publishers to increase the price of ebooks through the use of an 
agency distribution model under which the publishers, not resellers, would 
determine retail prices.137  Before Apple launched the iPad, it entered into 
contracts with five of the six major publishing houses.138  The government 
asserted that the contracts incentivized the publishers to prevent Amazon 
from continuing to sell bestsellers and new releases for $9.99, a price that 
Apple believed was unsustainable.139 
In a sharply divided decision, two judges of the panel agreed that the per 
se rule applied to Apple’s conduct, rather than the rule of reason.140  The 
court emphasized that the conduct at issue was not the individual vertical 
contracts with Apple, but rather the fact that “Apple’s offer to the 
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[p]ublisher [d]efendants hinged on whether it could successfully help 
organize them to force Amazon to an agency model and then to use their 
newfound collective control to raise ebook prices.”141  This “use of the 
promise of higher prices as a bargaining chip to induce the [p]ublisher 
[d]efendants to participate in the iBookstore constituted a conscious 
commitment to the goal of raising ebook prices.”142  The Second Circuit, in 
an opinion written by Judge Debra Livingston with a concurrence in part 
and in the judgment by Judge Raymond Lohier, rejected the argument that 
Apple should have been permitted to introduce procompetitive justifications 
for horizontal price-fixing arrangements, stating that its conspiracy to raise 
prices was squarely in the focus of the per se rule and that the BMI line of 
cases was “limited to situations where the ‘restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.’”143  Even if BMI were read 
broadly, Judge Livingston continued, the BMI line of cases applied the rule 
of reason “only when the restraint at issue was imposed in connection with 
some kind of potentially efficient joint venture.”144 
In a strong dissent, Judge Dennis Jacobs argued that the court erred in 
holding that Apple’s conduct fell within the per se rule.  He urged that a 
proper application of the rule of reason test would find that Apple’s conduct 
was “unambiguously and overwhelmingly pro-competitive” because it 
sought to introduce another player into the ebooks market to challenge 
Amazon’s monopoly.145 
The sharp differences in the majority and dissenting opinions reflect the 
difficulties presented where a customer seeks to enter a market by offering 
similar terms to multiple sellers.  Ordinarily, the sellers’ parallel conduct in 
response would not give rise to an inference of conspiracy.  The record in 
Apple, however, contained evidence from which the district court concluded 
that the publishers’ parallel conduct was not an accident but rather the result 
of agreement, which Apple willingly facilitated.  The majority opinion was 
no doubt influenced by those findings.146 
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III.  DAMAGES UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 
The Second Circuit has played a key role in defining the proper measure 
of damages under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which prohibits 
anticompetitive price discrimination and is violated where “the effect of 
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition.”147  To 
recover damages for Robinson-Patman Act violations under the Clayton 
Act, however, purchasers alleging unlawful price discrimination must 
demonstrate actual damages attributable to the discrimination.  Courts have 
struggled to determine the proper theory of damages for such price 
discrimination.  The Second Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to 
take on this issue in its 1957 decision in Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas 
Co.,148 where Texas Company (“Texaco”) was represented on appeal by 
Professor Milton Handler,149 one of the leading antitrust practitioners and 
scholars of the twentieth century.  Before Enterprise, the Eighth Circuit had 
adopted the theory that the victim of price discrimination could 
automatically recover the difference between the higher price it paid and the 
lower price charged to its favored competitor.150  Writing for the Second 
Circuit, Judge Learned Hand rejected that “automatic damages” theory.  
More than twenty years later, Judge Hand’s alternative theory would figure 
prominently in the Supreme Court’s determination of the proper measure of 
damages for Robinson-Patman Act claims in J. Truett Payne Co. v. 
Chrysler Motors Corp.151 
The claims in Enterprise arose from price wars among competing gas 
stations along the main commuter route between New York and Hartford.  
The plaintiff operated one of the stations and brought Robinson-Patman Act 
claims against Texaco for charging the plaintiff more for gasoline than it 
charged its own stations positioned along the same commuter route during 
the price wars.152  The Connecticut district court concluded that Texaco’s 
pricing scheme was discriminatory and awarded the plaintiff damages 
measured by the difference between what Texaco charged its own stations 
and what it charged the plaintiff153 under the so-called “automatic 
damages” theory.154 
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The Second Circuit reversed, finding that, even if Texaco’s price 
structure was discriminatory, the plaintiff had failed to prove not only the 
amount of damages, but it also failed to prove that it had suffered any 
damages at all.  Judge Hand also rejected the automatic damages theory, 
concluding that, because the Robinson-Patman Act was aimed at preventing 
a favored purchaser from siphoning sales from a disfavored purchaser, the 
proper measure of damages would be the profits from the potential sales the 
plaintiff lost to competitors because of the defendant’s discriminatory 
pricing scheme, less any profits it made because it was free under Texaco’s 
pricing scheme to charge higher prices for gasoline than its competitors.155  
But, because the plaintiff had failed to introduce at trial reliable figures 
from which its alleged lost sales and profits could be calculated, the Second 
Circuit held that no damages could be awarded.156 
Between 1957 and 1981, the circuits were split on the proper measure of 
damages under the Robinson-Patman Act.  While the Seventh, Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits adopted the automatic damages measure,157 the Third, 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits followed the Second Circuit’s lead in 
Enterprise.158  The Fifth Circuit endorsed the Second Circuit’s approach in 
Enterprise in its 1979 decision in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, 
Inc.159  Truett Payne, a Chrysler dealership, claimed that Chrysler engaged 
in unlawful price discrimination when it required some dealers to sell more 
cars than others to qualify for the same bonus.  After a jury trial, the district 
court awarded treble damages based on the difference between the bonus 
the Truett Payne dealership actually received and what it would have 
received under a lawful bonus scheme.  The Fifth Circuit reversed, but did 
not decide whether Truett Payne in fact proved that Chrysler had violated 
the Robinson-Patman Act.  Instead, the court went directly to the question 
of damages and concluded that Truett Payne had “failed to introduce 
substantial evidence of injury attributable to [Chrysler’s program], much 
less substantial evidence of the amount of such injury.”160  In so holding, 
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district court’s finding that plaintiff was not entitled to a damages award because “[t]he 
record fails to show that [plaintiff’s competitors] . . . lowered the price at which they sold to 
the public, at all; nor is there proof in the record to show or tend to show that, during the 
period involved, the plaintiff-appellant lost any customers, or that he lost any profits”). 
 159. 607 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979).  The Fifth Circuit had previously affirmed a district 
court ruling also applying the Enterprise approach without issuing a written opinion. See 
McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (S.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d, 486 F.2d 1400 
(5th Cir. 1973). 
 160. Truett Payne, 607 F.2d. at 1135. 
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the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s theory of price discrimination 
damages set forth in Enterprise.161 
The Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice William 
Rehnquist, following the Second Circuit in soundly rejecting the “automatic 
damages theory,” and citing the Second Circuit’s opinion in Enterprise as 
the “leading case” rejecting the theory.162  The Court held that to “recover 
treble damages . . . a plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury 
attributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent”163 
and agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Enterprise that the mere 
fact of price discrimination is not by itself evidence of injury.164  The Court 
remanded Truett Payne to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether Chrysler’s 
bonus scheme actually violated the Robinson-Patman Act.165  The Second 
Circuit’s influence also extended to the partial dissent in Truett Payne:  
Justice Powell cited favorably to Judge Hand’s decision in Enterprise for 
the proposition that plaintiffs can recover damages under section 2(a) of the 
Robinson-Patman Act only by showing that unlawful price discrimination 
“allowed a favored competitor to draw sales or profits” from the disfavored 
competitor.166  Courts continue to rely on Enterprise’s clean articulation of 
the measure of damages under the Robinson-Patman Act.167 
 
 161. See id. at 1136. 
 162. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561 n.2 (1981). 
 163. Id. at 562. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Four Justices joined Justice Powell’s partial dissent, which favored affirming the 
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the plaintiff had “failed to introduce substantial evidence of 
injury attributable to [respondent’s program], much less substantial evidence of the amount 
of such injury.” Id. at 569 (Powell, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Truett 
Payne, 607 F.2d at 1135). 
 166. Id.  On remand, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Truett Payne did not introduce 
sufficient evidence of the violation or of its injuries to withstand Chrysler’s motions for 
directed verdict. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
 167. See, e.g., Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing to 
Justice Powell’s discussion of Enterprise in his partial dissent in Truett Payne); Drug Mart 
Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp, 472 F. Supp. 2d 385, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(citing to Enterprise for the proposition that “the pricing margin caused by the illegal 
discrimination can only be used to quantify damages if the plaintiffs demonstrate that the 
favored purchasers lowered their prices in an amount equivalent to the illegal benefit they 
received” in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment—argued by author Saul 
Morgenstern—dismissing claims of “representative plaintiffs”).  Drug Mart has a tortured 
history, during which plaintiffs were at pains to show that the lower prices that defendant 
pharmaceutical manufacturers gave to favored purchasers actually caused smaller 
pharmacies to lose sales.  Using the Enterprise approach to damage analysis, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York crafted a process to identify customers that 
plaintiff pharmacies lost to a favored competitor.  After this process revealed that plaintiffs 
lost very few customers, the court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. 
See Drug Mart Pharmacy Corp. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 93-CV-5148, 2012 WL 
3544771, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. August 16, 2012). 
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IV.  ANTITRUST STANDING:  
WHO CAN SUE FOR AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION? 
Antitrust violations can, in certain circumstances, have a ripple effect of 
injuries throughout the market.  The bare language of the Clayton Act gives 
an apparently unlimited right of action for damages to “any person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
in the antitrust laws.”168  Yet, almost from its enactment, courts have 
narrowed its reach.169 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Limitations on Antitrust Standing 
Drawing on the legislative history of the Clayton and Sherman Acts and 
common law principles limiting liability to reasonably foreseeable injuries, 
the Supreme Court in 1972 set some limits on standing to bring antitrust 
actions in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California.170  There, the Court 
said that states could not sue for damages attributable to violations of 
antitrust laws because such suits would open the door to “duplicative 
recovery.”171  Then, in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,172 the 
Supreme Court squarely addressed the apparent conflict between these 
court-imposed limits and the Clayton Act’s broad language.173  Antitrust 
violations can cause cascading injuries throughout the market, and the 
Court sought to limit antitrust standing to prevent duplicative recovery from 
defendants to remedy every injury.174  The Court declined to take a position 
on the various tests articulated in the circuit courts175 and refused “to 
engraft artificial limits on the [s]ection 4 remedy.”176  Instead, the Court set 
forth a two-step analysis that required courts to look 
(1) [t]o the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation 
and the harm to the plaintiff, and (2) more particularly, to the relationship 
of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which Congress was 
 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).  The Clayton Act amended the Sherman Act’s equally 
broad provision that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any 
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by 
this act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United States.” Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 
7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).  Persons include corporations and associations existing under the 
federal law or the law of any State or foreign country. See 15 U.S.C. § 7.  Although section 4 
limits recovery for foreign states to actual damages plus costs and attorney’s fees, see 15 
U.S.C. § 15(b), it otherwise imposes no limits on the persons who can bring suits or the type 
of damages that injured persons are eligible to recover. 
 169. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1910) (denying 
recovery to stockholders injured by antitrust violations because they were not directly 
injured). 
 170. 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see id. at 264. 
 171. Id. at 263–64. 
 172. 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
 173. Id. at 472–74 (citing Standard Oil, 405 U.S. at 274); see also Cavanagh, supra note 
22, at 810–18. 
 174. McCready, 457 U.S. at 474. 
 175. Id. at 476 n.12, 478 n.14. 
 176. Id. at 472. 
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likely to have been concerned in making defendant’s conduct unlawful 
and in providing a private remedy under [section] 4.177 
McCready’s insurer refused to reimburse her for psychotherapy because 
she was treated by a psychologist rather than a psychiatrist.178  McCready 
alleged that her insurer had colluded with psychiatrists to exclude 
psychologists from providing psychotherapy by refusing to cover services 
that were similar or identical to what a psychiatrist would provide.179  The 
Court agreed that McCready’s injuries—the denial of insurance benefits—
gave her standing to sue.180  The Court refused to deny a remedy to 
psychologists, who were the intended target of the conspiracy, concluding 
that McCready’s injury also arose from “that which makes defendants’ acts 
unlawful.”181 
A year later, the Supreme Court muddied the antitrust standing waters in 
its opinion in Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of 
Carpenters.182  There, two unions alleged that an association of 
construction contractors had coerced their members into hiring nonunion 
workers with the goal of sabotaging union workers and the construction 
contractors who hired them.183  The Court held that the unions’ injuries, 
unlike McCready’s, were the indirect effects of antitrust violations squarely 
aimed at construction firms and individual union members.184  In reaching 
its decision, the Court set forth a list of six factors relevant to antitrust 
standing without explicitly stating that the factors constitute a test for 
standing:  (1) the “causal connection between an antitrust violation and 
harm to the [plaintiff],” (2) “the nature of the plaintiff’s injury” and whether 
it is the type of injury that the antitrust laws were intended to vindicate, (3) 
“the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury,” (4) “the existence of 
an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate 
them to vindicate the public interest in alleged antitrust enforcement” and 
whether plaintiff is within that class, (5) the speculative nature of the 
damages claim, and (6) the “potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages.”185 
B.  Antitrust Standing in the Second Circuit After 
McCready and Associated General Contractors 
In 1983, in the wake of McCready and Associated General Contractors, 
the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Henry Friendly, took a fresh 
look at antitrust standing in Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 
 
 177. Id. at 478. 
 178. Id. at 468. 
 179. Id. at 469–70. 
 180. Id. at 479. 
 181. Id. at 484 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977)). 
 182. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
 183. Id. at 520–21. 
 184. Id. at 539–44. 
 185. Id. at 537–45. 
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Inc.186  Judge Friendly explained that McCready signaled a liberalization of 
the notion of antitrust injury, because the Supreme Court explicitly 
acknowledged that individuals need not be direct competitors of defendants 
to have standing to bring antitrust claims,187 and found not only that the 
standing analysis in Associated General Contractors was entirely consistent 
with McCready but that it actually strengthened Crimpers’ case.188 
Crimpers Promotions was formed to host a single trade show that would 
bring together all producers of cable television programming in a single 
forum to facilitate purchase of programming from individual producers, 
rather than simply in packages created by defendants Home Box Office 
(HBO) and Showtime.189  Crimpers alleged that HBO and Showtime 
contacted producers and told them not to attend the show, that it was a “rip-
off” and a fraud, and that no exhibitors would attend.190  The trade show 
ultimately took place, but with dismal attendance by exhibitors and 
producers.191 
Crimpers teaches that the purpose underlying the antitrust laws provides 
two limitations on antitrust standing:  First, antitrust standing should be 
limited to prevent double recovery.  Second, it should exclude those injuries 
that are “too remote” from the alleged antitrust violation.192  To assess 
remoteness, courts should look to the “physical and economic nexus 
between the alleged violation and the harm” and the relationship between 
the alleged injuries and the sort of injury Congress sought to prevent in 
enacting the antitrust laws.193  The Second Circuit refused to find that 
Crimpers was not “the victim of a successful boycott” or that Crimpers 
lacked standing simply because it “was not a buyer or seller but was 
endeavoring to provide a method whereby buyers and sellers could deal 
effectively with each other without paying tribute to the defendants.”194  
The Court thus concluded that, “free[d] . . . from the miasma of adjectives 
that has accumulated around the words of [section] 4,” Crimpers presents a 
“paradigm of standing.”195  Other circuits have continued to rely on 
Crimpers’s explanation of the factors relevant to antitrust standing and, in 
particular, on its reconciliation of McCready with Associated General 
Contractors.196 
 
 186. 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 187. Id. at 292. 
 188. Id. at 293. 
 189. Id. at 291. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 294 (citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982)). 
 193. Id. (citing McCready, 457 U.S. at 466). 
 194. Id. at 297. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., Carpet Grp. Int’l v. Oriental Rug Imps. Ass’n, 227 F.3d 62, 77 (3d Cir. 
2000) (finding Crimpers “persuasive” in explaining that an injury was a direct consequence 
of an antitrust violation), abrogated on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China 
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2011); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 
1511–12 (9th Cir. 1996) (following Crimpers in concluding that plaintiffs have standing to 
challenge defendant’s antitrust violations even if they are not direct competitors, so long as 
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Five years later, in Volvo, the Second Circuit considered whether the 
organizer of professional men’s tennis tournaments could be liable under 
the antitrust laws to a sponsor of those tournaments.197  The two governing 
bodies that oversee men’s professional tennis tournaments had entered into 
an agreement that limited compensation for players, gave certain 
tournaments scheduling priority, and generally required players 
participating in prestigious tournaments to agree to participate in certain 
tournaments organized by either governing body, and not to participate in 
other tennis events that competed with them.198  The expenses of running 
the tournaments were borne by sponsors, such as plaintiff Volvo.199 Volvo 
was also a producer of tennis tournaments and had itself entered into certain 
restrictive agreements with the governing bodies.200  Nevertheless, Volvo 
filed an antitrust action against one of the governing bodies, arguing that the 
agreements limited its ability to produce tennis tournaments in the manner it 
preferred and caused the events it did produce and sponsor to be less 
profitable than they otherwise might have been.201 
The Second Circuit thus had to consider whether Volvo, which 
voluntarily entered the restrictive cartel of professional tennis tournaments, 
had standing to challenge the actions of that cartel.  Following McCready, 
the court fashioned a two-part test, under which the court first asks whether 
the plaintiff has prima facie standing, then considers whether any of a range 
of factors would defeat standing.202  The primary rationale behind the Volvo 
test is that the antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition, not 
competitors, so if a member of a cartel would be better off if it were free to 
compete, and its own interests align with the public interest in competition, 
then the cartel member has standing to challenge the cartel’s antitrust 
violations.203  The Second Circuit reiterated that an antitrust injury is an 
injury of the sort antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and one that flows 
from the defendant’s antitrust violations.  Once a plaintiff has sufficiently 
alleged an antitrust injury, courts then consider whether the factors set forth 
in Associated General Contractors nonetheless defeat plaintiff’s 
standing.204 
Finally, in R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V.,205 the Second Circuit 
moved more completely toward a holistic, fact-intensive analysis of 
 
they compete in a particular market segment); see also Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, 
Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1495 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that, in Crimpers, the Second Circuit 
“has aligned itself with the liberal standing approach of [McCready] and distinguished 
Associated General [Contractors] as not limiting the application of [McCready]”). 
 197. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
 198. Id. at 59. 
 199. Id. at 58. 
 200. Id. at 59. 
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 204. Id. at 66 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 540–45 (1983)). 
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antitrust standing in the merger area.  Bigelow, an herbal tea producer, 
sought to enjoin the merger of two rival tea sellers—Lipton and Celestial 
Seasonings, the two largest herbal tea producers in the market—because the 
merged entity would control 84 percent of the herbal tea market and, 
therefore, would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly.206  The district court granted Unilever’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Bigelow’s evidence about the amount of the market 
share was not sufficient to establish standing, and stating that more specific 
factual allegations and evidence were needed—either evidence of past 
predatory pricing or of present intent to engage in predatory behavior 
postmerger.207  Reversing the district court, the Second Circuit held that 
Bigelow, as a competitor of the merging parties, had standing to challenge 
the merger.208  The court concluded that a postacquisition market share of 
84 percent constituted “prima facie evidence of monopoly power” and “is 
so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be 
enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not 
likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”209  Although the court declined 
to adopt a per se rule that an 84 percent market share violates section 7 of 
the Clayton Act, it concluded that the market share data created a genuine 
issue of material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment to 
Unilever.210  In contrast to their endorsement of Crimpers, other circuits 
have been less inclined to follow the Second Circuit in Bigelow.211 
In sum, as the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on standing has developed, 
determining whether a particular plaintiff has standing to pursue an antitrust 
claim has become a highly contextual and fact-intensive inquiry.  It has also 
pushed other circuits toward a more liberal approach to antitrust 
standing.212 
V.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CONTRIBUTION 
TO THE LAW OF PLEADING STANDARDS AFTER 
BELL ATLANTIC CORP. V. TWOMBLY 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), adopted in 1937, provides that “[a] 
pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”213  
When the rule was adopted, there was discussion of separate, stricter 
requirements for antitrust, patent, copyright, and other allegedly special 
types of litigation, but such proposals were rejected in favor of a uniform, 
 
 206. Id. at 104, 107–10. 
 207. Id. at 105. 
 208. Id. at 107–11. 
 209. Id. at 108 (quoting United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) 
(emphasis removed)). 
 210. Id. at 111. 
 211. See, e.g., Anago, Inc. v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that the Fifth Circuit has parted company with the Second Circuit on antitrust 
standing in Bigelow and other cases). 
 212. See supra note 196. 
 213. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
2016] ANTITRUST IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 137 
liberal pleading standard.  Despite this liberal standard, over the decades 
since Rule 8(a) was adopted, defense lawyers continued to advocate for, 
and courts occasionally applied, a heightened pleading rule in antitrust 
actions because of the great expense often involved, especially in class 
actions.  Those arguments made little headway until the Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.214 
In Twombly, a class of consumers sued local telephone and internet 
service providers, alleging an antitrust conspiracy—based on parallel 
conduct—to prevent competitive entry into local telephone and Internet 
service markets and to avoid competing with each other in their respective 
markets.215  In a 2005 opinion by Judge Robert Sack, the Second Circuit 
reversed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the district court had 
erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard by requiring that “plus 
factors” be expressly alleged for an antitrust conspiracy based on parallel 
conduct to survive a motion to dismiss.216  The Second Circuit stated that 
the facts alleged in a complaint do “need to include conspiracy among the 
realm of plausible possibilities,” but went on to hold, relying on Conley v. 
Gibson217 and Nagler v. Admiral,218 that “short of the extremes of ‘bare 
bones’ and ‘implausibility,’ a complaint in an antitrust case need only 
contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.’”219 
The Supreme Court reversed,220 sparking a renewed debate in the lower 
courts about what a plaintiff must plead to state an antitrust claim.  While 
the Supreme Court stated that it was not articulating a heightened pleading 
standard, and reaffirmed Conley’s requirement that a complaint provide 
notice plus grounds for relief, it held that those grounds must be 
“plausible.”221  Moreover, although the Second Circuit had not expressly 
relied on the Conley holding that a complaint should not be dismissed 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim,” the Supreme Court stated that the Second Circuit 
appeared to have implicitly done so by accepting the plaintiffs’ wholly 
conclusory allegations of conspiracy.222  Thus, unlike the Second Circuit, 
the Supreme Court concluded that there was no “plausible suggestion of 
conspiracy” in the allegations of the Twombly complaint.223 
 
 214. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 215. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 102–106 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 216. Id. at 116. 
 217. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 218. 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). 
 219. Twombly, 425 F.3d at 111 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). 
 220. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).  Although Twombly was an 
antitrust case, the pleading standards it set forth apply across the board to all types of cases. 
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (interpreting the plausibility standard of Twombly 
in the context of a federal civil rights action). 
 221. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 222. Id. at 561.  The Supreme Court went on to overrule the “no set of facts” aspect of 
Conley, holding that the “phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard.” Id. at 563. 
 223. Id. at 566. 
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The Supreme Court further explained that a complaint in an antitrust 
conspiracy case is “plausible” where it provides “enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made,” that is, “enough 
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal agreement.”224  However, exactly what the Supreme Court meant by 
“plausible” is not clear.  A complaint that contains conclusory, as opposed 
to factual, allegations, is not plausible.225  Additionally, allegations that 
make the conduct in question merely possible do not meet the plausibility 
standard.226  On the other end of the spectrum, plausibility does not demand 
that the plaintiff show that the conduct is probable.227  Plausible thus falls 
somewhere between possible and probable, but the dividing line is not 
clear.228   
A.  The Second Circuit’s Application of Twombly 
The task of clarifying Twombly’s plausibility standard has been left to the 
lower courts to develop on a case-by-case basis, and federal courts 
throughout the country have since attempted to define what constitutes a 
“plausible” claim.  Unsurprisingly, the Second Circuit has had its share of 
important decisions. 
1.  In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation 
In September 2007, in the first court of appeals decision to apply 
Twombly to an antitrust complaint, the Second Circuit in In re Elevator 
Antitrust Litigation229 set a higher bar than it previously had for plaintiffs 
alleging an antitrust conspiracy.  The Second Circuit applied Twombly to 
affirm the dismissal of an antitrust complaint regarding an alleged price-
fixing scheme among elevator companies.230  In this case, a class of 
consumers who purchased elevators and elevator repair and maintenance 
services filed a complaint alleging that four major elevator companies 
engaged in a conspiracy in the United States and Europe to monopolize the 
market.231  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the elevator companies 
participated in meetings to discuss pricing and market divisions, agreed to 
fix prices, rigged bids for sales and maintenance, exchanged price quotes, 
and collusively required customers to enter long-term maintenance 
contracts.232 
While the Second Circuit wrestled with the Supreme Court’s recent 
mandate in Twombly, acknowledging that there is still “considerable 
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uncertainty”233 as to how broadly it should be applied, it nonetheless 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the complaint’s 
conspiracy allegations provided “no plausible grounds to support the 
inference of an unlawful agreement.”234  The Second Circuit concluded that 
plaintiffs’ allegations were merely conclusory and that they amounted to 
“basically every type of conspiratorial activity that one could imagine.”235  
Further, the court reasoned that while the alleged parallel conduct was 
consistent with a conspiracy, it is “just as much in line with a wide swath of 
rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by 
common perceptions of the market.”236 
2.  Starr v. SONY BMG Music Entertainment 
Three years later, in Starr v. SONY BMG Music Entertainment,237 the 
Second Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal of an antitrust challenge 
brought by a group of consumers alleging an antitrust conspiracy among 
major record labels to fix the prices and terms under which their music 
would be sold over the Internet.238  While the district court had dismissed 
the complaint for failure to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ factual allegations placed 
the record labels’ parallel conduct “in a context that raises a suggestion of a 
preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be 
independent action.”239  Unlike the conclusory allegations in the Elevator 
case, the specific facts the plaintiffs in Sony alleged included that the prices 
charged by defendants’ two music services were unreasonably high—while 
their rival charged only $0.25 a song, defendants charged $0.75 a song; 
defendants all increased prices in the face of substantially reduced costs; 
defendants “controll[ed] over 80 [percent] of [d]igital [m]usic sold to end 
purchasers in the United States”;240 defendants used most favored nation 
(MFN) clauses in their licenses that effectively guaranteed they would 
receive terms no less favorable than those of other licensors, and then tried 
to hide the MFNs (including in “secret side letters”) because they knew the 
MFNs “would attract antitrust scrutiny”; and one industry commentator 
observed that “‘nobody in their right mind’ would want to use” these 
services, which suggested to the Second Circuit that “some form of 
agreement among defendants would have been needed to render the 
enterprises profitable.”241  Based on these allegations, the court held that 
the Sony complaint “succeeds where Twombly’s failed because the 
complaint alleges specific facts sufficient to plausibly suggest that the 
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parallel conduct alleged was the result of an agreement among the 
defendants.”242 
Finally, the Second Circuit clarified that—consistent with its pre-
Twombly jurisprudence—when basing a claim on parallel conduct, a 
plaintiff is not required to allege facts that tend to exclude independent self-
interested conduct on the part of the defendants, nor does the plaintiff have 
to identify the specific time or place or person involved in the conspiracy at 
the pleading stage.243  The Second Circuit’s Sony decision thus broadened 
and clarified the type of allegations that can constitute a sufficient plausible 
factual basis for a Sherman Act section 1 claim under Twombly. 
3.  Anderson News LLC v. American Media Inc. 
In one of the most recent circuit court decisions to shed light on the 
Twombly pleading standard, the Second Circuit in 2012 vacated the district 
court’s denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint in Anderson 
News L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.244  There, the plaintiff magazine 
wholesaler claimed that a group of magazine publishers and their 
distributors violated section 1 by conspiring to drive the plaintiff wholesaler 
out of business.245  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant publishers and 
distributors colluded to monopolize the “single-copy” (nonsubscription) 
magazine sector, of which the plaintiff was the second largest wholesaler in 
the United States, by cutting off the plaintiff’s and another wholesaler’s 
magazine supply and dividing the wholesale business between two 
remaining (nonboycotted) wholesalers.246  Specifically, the plaintiff alleged 
that because wholesalers had to bear the cost of handling and returning 
unsold magazines (up to 80 percent of magazines shipped), plaintiffs had 
implemented a surcharge on all single-copy magazines to be paid by the 
publisher defendants.247  In response to that surcharge, the plaintiff alleged 
that the publisher defendants and the national distributor defendants had 
“cut off 80 [percent] of Anderson’s magazine supply,” “sought to acquire 
Anderson’s distribution facilities,” and “poached Anderson’s employees 
and their proprietary intellectual property.”248  Plaintiffs further alleged that 
defendants, who were otherwise competitors, met numerous times during 
the weeks before the boycott and discussed dividing the U.S. distribution 
territory into two regions to be controlled by the two remaining 
wholesalers.249 
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning 
that the plaintiff’s allegations of collusion were precluded by its own 
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conduct in imposing a surcharge, and that the defendants’ refusal to do 
business with the plaintiff thereafter could be attributed to the publisher 
defendants’ independent business decisions in response to the imposition of 
that surcharge.250  The district court therefore held that the plaintiff’s 
allegations did not meet Twombly’s plausibility standard, finding that 
“[u]nilateral parallel conduct is completely plausible in this context,”251 and 
denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an 
amended complaint.252 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court erred in ruling 
that the allegations in the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint were 
facially implausible under Twombly.  Judge Amalya Kearse addressed the 
proper application of Twombly:  “[A]t the pleading stage, a complaint 
claiming conspiracy, to be plausible, must plead ‘enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.’”253  However, the 
allegations need not rule out the possibility of independent action.  The 
Second Circuit distinguished the plaintiff’s allegations in the proposed 
amended complaint from the allegations found insufficient in Twombly on 
the grounds that the proposed amended complaint alleged that the 
defendants “had met or communicated with their competitors and others 
and made statements that may plausibly be interpreted as evincing their 
agreement to attempt to eliminate Anderson.”254  The court explained that 
“[t]he question at the pleading stage is not whether there is a plausible 
alternative to the plaintiff’s theory; the question is whether there are 
sufficient factual allegations to make the complaint’s claim plausible.”255  
The court admonished that “it is not the province of the court to dismiss the 
complaint on the basis of the court’s choice among plausible 
alternatives.”256  Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the district court 
was incorrect in ruling that the plaintiff did not state a plausible claim.257 
The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ petition for certiorari, 
choosing not to review the Second Circuit’s Twombly analysis.258  This 
decision thus has the potential to become an influential decision on pleading 
antitrust conspiracies. 
B.  Other Circuits Have Followed 
the Second Circuit’s Application of Twombly 
The Second Circuit’s approach in Sony and Anderson News created a 
blueprint for other circuits to follow.  For example, the Sixth Circuit in Erie 
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County v. Morton Salt, Inc.259 affirmed the dismissal of a complaint 
alleging price fixing by Ohio salt mine operators.260  It cited the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Sony as the only instance in which a circuit court 
considered and rejected extending the pleading standard to require plaintiffs 
to allege facts that exclude the possibility of lawful, independent 
conduct.261  The First Circuit followed the analysis set forth in Anderson 
News in its decision in Evergreen Partnering Group, Inc. v. Pactiv Corp.262  
There, the court vacated dismissal of a complaint that alleged that food 
service packaging manufacturers and two trade associations refused, in 
concert, to deal with the plaintiff.263  The First Circuit agreed with the 
Second Circuit’s elucidation of Twombly’s plausibility standard, stating that 
a complaint must at least allege “the general contours of when an agreement 
was made, supporting those allegations with a context that tends to make 
said agreement plausible.”264 
CONCLUSION 
While it has not been possible to cover all of the Second Circuit’s 
significant contributions in the area of antitrust law in these pages, the areas 
and cases discussed illustrate the Second Circuit’s strong and lasting 
influence on the nation’s antitrust jurisprudence.  Given the court’s location 
at one of the world’s economic centers, and its rich tradition of legal 
leadership, there is little doubt that it will continue to do so in the future. 
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